with obstacles considering that equalisation of opportunities does not necessarily bring equal outcomes to people. Also, a fairer resource distribution alone may not be sufficient given that we live on a finite planet. Finally, as an antidote to corporate education and a culture of learning as an end in itself, civic education for parents and children is central to developing shared notions of the common good and the kind of society we want to live in.
Civic education
Education plays a significant role in promoting parents' and children's human agency and a truly human life. To develop human agency, parents require genuine opportunities for education that go beyond skills (parenting or otherwise) as well as capability building to make the most of the opportunities available to them. To this end, education, as Neal Lawson and Ken Spours argue, should be about 'developing the collective capacity of people to be able to govern themselves' and engage in social change. Civic education is about developing a sense of who we are as individuals and communities but also about empathy and the common good. But education can only achieve these goals and promote democracy when, in itself, it is democratically governed. Within school effectiveness, for example, accountability is individuated and teachers are de-professionalised, operating within managerial structures that are not always democratic. Current market forces have shaped education by not only altering the processes and mechanisms of teaching and learning but also setting new norms to frame the purpose of education, replacing pedagogy with instrumental and short-term processes of accumulating human and social capital. Schools and other learning institutions use the language of 'value added', 'value for money', costefficiency, target setting, business terms which 'fail to recognise the rich unpredictability of learning ' (Nixon, 2004, p. 1) . In thinking about civic education, it is difficult not to be influenced by these terms and the orientation in pedagogy they espouse. A managerialist language has caused deep ideological shifts in education, questioning its intrinsic value and reducing education to skill acquisition. However, civic education can promote skills and much more: it can support parents and children to become aware of accomplishments and be receptive of knowledge in the context of their life.
Civic education offers an expansive vision of education at the heart of a civic society and underpins the politics of the common good. This is education that operates at both means and ends: instrumental in terms of supporting parents and children to develop the capabilities required to function as engaged citizens and intrinsic in terms of education as a value within and for itself. As discussed in Part I, parental education plays an important role in influencing children's life chances. Although these findings may suggest an instrumental orientation, that is, maternal education as a means for achieving school outcomes, they highlight the power education holds over individuals' life chances. The average family with parents lacking in educational qualifications finds it increasingly difficult to cope. Wilcox (2010) wrote that 'Middle Americans' -people with a high school diploma but not a college degree -find it difficult to function in society. According to Wilcox, the family life of today's parents with secondary school education increasingly resembles the life (in terms of financial insecurity, lack of employment) of uneducated people, whereas in the 1970s it closely resembled those of college graduates. In explaining why policies have failed to tackle poverty in the United Kingdom, Rowson and colleagues (2010) argued that individuals in poverty lack the education to take advantage of the opportunities that globalisation presents. There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence for the crucial role that education plays in offering parents decent-wage jobs and having a strong positive impact on children's outcomes (see Part I). For people with university degrees, especially postgraduate degrees, access to employment has been good thus far (Peck, 2011) . In light of this, however, one may ask why the focus of family policy has not been on providing genuine educational opportunities to disadvantaged parents instead of parenting skills.
Clearly, what educated parents do with their children has a significant impact in terms of accessing educational resources and services and also expanding their vision of society beyond their current situation. However, learning and a greater awareness should not solely be instrumentalist, viewed as a means of solving problems about climate, poverty or inequality, but also expand knowledge and capacity for empathy and critical thinking. In times of crisis, there is a danger to pursue knowledge as a means to specific ends but civic education should reverse this trend. Civic education is not about accumulating mere skills for preparing a future workforce to fit into market structures because we do not know what a future workforce would look like and also the market structures are not fixed but malleable. For example, as technology is improving and the number of people gaining education is on the rise, at least in emerging economies, the nature of employment is changing rapidly. In many Western countries the economic pressures have been moving up the educational ladder in that people need to obtain higher educational qualifications to compete in the marketplace, and even then the existence of decent-wage jobs is precarious.
Civic education can lead to an economic betterment but, most crucially, it is about being open to other possibilities and the making of a good society. It is about promoting awareness and knowledge to enable young people and their families to live together and create possible futures, to build a different type of society from the one we have now. Raising and educating children is not a cost-benefit exercise but an act of hope and faith in the existence of other possibilities beyond earning. Neoliberal ideas and the exploitation they espouse have become entrenched in society and its institutions and it can be challenging to reclaim excellence, passion and dynamism when these terms are used as a thin veneer to cover cultures of exploitation. To change the public from being spectators to agents in their own remaking, civic education has an important role to play in striving for the common good in pluralistic societies. Political top-down approaches to behaviour modification do not amount to a good society. This is particularly relevant considering the rise of dangerous ideologies and fundamentalist thinking.
Civic education is a force for the common good which is about educating young people for a 'world that is or becoming out of joint ' (Arendt, 1958) . To this end, education should embrace uncertainty and challenge consensus: the world is not predictable and thus education cannot be geared towards the possibility of an ordered world. Education for social justice and the good society should embrace the possibility of difference where dissent and competing discourses are essential to helping young people to develop criticality and a culture of extended compassion towards human weakness and vulnerability, as attributes common to all. This is crucial considering that within corporate structures, people become atomised individuals and an assemblage of wants and desires for the market to satisfy. The market emerges as the facilitator of the individuals' attempts of devising lifestyles that fit their needs and desires through the tools of choice and consumption. Desires met by the market may feel good for an individual but are likely to work counter to the common good. Moreover, they promote a distorted image of ourselves and our relationship to the natural and social world which can have significant consequences: the lessening of human agency and a view of human beings (especially those in poverty) as being diminished or a liability for whom the state has to assume an interventionist role.
Through civic education, young people may achieve what Mathew Taylor (2010) describes as a 'socially embedded model of individualism' to embrace the rights of the individual, cultivate empathy and counteract the hubris in being captive by wants. Such education resides in the humanities and sciences where through scientific knowledge, history, film and the study of philosophical and religious ethics and global economic and environmental systems, young people may get into the habit of decoding the suffering of others to understand lives both near and far and their relationship to the natural world. As Nussbaum (2003) argues, young people develop empathy by learning to be 'tragic spectators, and to understand with increasing subtlety and responsiveness the predicaments to which human life is prone'. There is a consensus among social commentators that societies increasingly become more empathic as a result of civil rights movements, travelling and coming into contact with different cultures and, as Steven Pinker argues in The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, exposure to literacy and book reading which cultivate perspective taking. Although there may be a decline in physical violence in certain parts of the world, it is hard to argue for a decline in symbolic and political violence. Inequality, the destruction that globalisation has brought to communities and people's lives and the rise of new social apartheids push us to rethink progress. We tend to equate progress with human welfare and although progress can contribute to human welfare they are not the same. As we move into the second decade of the 21st century, the enlightenment principles of progress, reason and centrality of economics in politics require rethinking. Through civic education, we may be well placed to consider the relational nature of progress because we certainly have the technical knowledge to understand how to accomplish things but the question is whether we know what these things are and are aware of the moral dilemmas in our attempts to seek them.
To become a force towards the common good, civic education must foster the habit of critical thinking, rooting out the inconsistencies of a self-serving thought, a key role for secular philosophy and humanism to play. And it must also excite the imagination through the arts and sciences and offer knowledge on the world's economic conditions in both developed and developing countries and the adverse living conditions that surround a large proportion of the world's people. Because of heterodox beliefs and approaches to parenting and child rearing, the fast moving pace of technology and the immediacy that characterises society, there are profound ethical disagreements about the nature of the common good, entailing many different narratives with a sharp distinction between politics and morality. This is compounded by the rise of an individuated culture and awareness that morality cannot be sustained solely within religion. In his theory of justice, Rawls (1971) accepts that because reasonable people have different visions of what is good, 'the point of a good polity is not to promote a particular vision of the good life, it's to ensure that goods are distributed fairly so that we can then go out and pursue our respective visions of the good life on a fair basis'. For Rawls, access to equal opportunities is sufficient for individuals to achieve equivalent outcomes. For Sen, however, individuals are not equal in their capacity to convert opportunities to valued functionings and thus equality of opportunity alone is less likely to promote equality in a society and sustain actions towards the common good. Although moral and political principles are justified to the extent they promote the common good for the greatest numbers, in unequal societies, the common good should be about cultivating individual and collective resistance to greed in that citizenship should not be defined in terms of possessions.
A feminist orientation to family policy
Despite allusions to feminism in family policy (by using neutral terms such as parenting; see Chapter 8), a feminist orientation to family policy has been long overdue. With the proliferation of gender-neutral family policies, parenting and issues related to employment and education opportunities for parents need to be addressed within a feminist legal framework. A lack of such framework may result in normative and potentially inaccurate conceptions of parenthood (e.g. motherhood as being desirable for all women; fathers and mothers as being equally involved and thus allocation of parenting duties is equal) that feed into family policy. Gender-neutral parenting has been used as a wide brush in family policy, and there is very little on the implications of motherhood as being separate from fatherhood in terms of women's unequal pay, unemployment, pressure to combine paid and unpaid work, social class differences regarding experiences of motherhood, unequal allocation of parenting responsibilities at home or financial instability upon divorce to mention a few (see Chapter 8 for a discussion on a multifaceted jeopardy that mothers are likely to face). Before we use gender-neutral terms, we need to sort out the politics of domestic life and tackle gender inequality. Placing the onus on parents is essentially about placing the onus on mothers to overcome structural constraints at both societal and personal levels.
By actively engaging with a feminist legal scholarship, family policy may find ways to articulate gender equality and difference and its implications on parenting; the politics and ethics of care in the family; and the diversity in perceptions of motherhood (e.g. oppressive or life affirming), particularly the ambivalence of motherhood that defined feminist scholarship of the early 1990s. The third-wave feminism of the 1990s developed a more 'sympathetic and empathetic mode' towards motherhood by encompassing mainstream identities in an attempt to counteract marginalisation for women who do not engage with traditional roles and expressions of femininity. For the third wave, the political became personal in a process that was congruent with and facilitated by the rise of a therapeutic culture. For example, third-wave feminist memoir writers such as Walker and Orenstein in the United States have approached motherhood in a depoliticised manner, as a fulfilment of women's personal desires. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, writers such as Rachel Cusk talk about the ambivalence experienced with motherhood and its impact on women's personal agency. These writings convey a strong sense of anxiety about motherhood and the disastrous possibility of top-down state interference with it. Such ideas contrast with the second-wave feminist writings on motherhood. In 1979, Adrienne Rich published Of Woman Born: Motherhood as an Experience and Institution in which motherhood was discussed as an act of marginalisation, arguing that mothers tend to be perceived as unable to make decisions about their lives and fathers as unengaged with their children. Clearly, within the second wave, motherhood was perceived as being responsible for the schism between private and public life which aimed to marginalise women. As discussed in the previous chapter, although third-wave feminism is more sympathetic to motherhood, it lacks an institutional and political analysis of both motherhood and fatherhood and does not acknowledge the de-politicised (and policy-driven) status of the family.
A feminist orientation to parenting not as a mere service to the well-being of children but a central human experience is timely and essentially relevant. Contemporary policy constructions of parenthood do not engage with parent-driven critiques about the experiences of being a parent. An ambivalence regarding parenthood is evident in family policy, especially with regard to how competent and effective parents are viewed to be. But this differs from the ambivalence to motherhood as articulated by mothers because the former is policy driven and imposed on parents who live in poverty. Family policy should take on board women's and men's personal stories and truths to develop a legal and pragmatic (and not a moralistic) vocabulary about the experiences of parenting. Otherwise, there is a danger that the plurality of parents' voices and their experiences of parenthood may amount to no more than mere subjectivities. A lack of parental perspectives also normalises parental anxiety about child rearing with parents either engaging in hyper-parenting or risking to be seen as failing in their duties. A feminist legal theory has the potential to engage with the wider issues that affect parenting such as structural inequality in employment (gender inequality of pay, motherhood gap) and education, and normative conceptions of motherhood and, most importantly, to create a critical space in which family policy is debated and mothers and fathers are supported in their decisions about child rearing.
A feminist orientation in family policy means to question the forced separation in the challenges children and parents face. Policy makers and politicians should no longer view parents and children in isolation from each other (we talk about child poverty but not family poverty or about ailing childhoods but not ailing families): if, for some parents, children's rearing has become a task fraught with the possibility of failure, it is because parents' lives have become difficult. The 2007 UNICEF report warns of ailing and unhappy childhoods attributing this mostly to busy parents and a limited parental involvement (although data from national longitudinal datasets suggest otherwise; see Chapters 1 and 3). However, the UNICEF report fails to consider that children are unhappy because their parents are unhappy. Separating the challenges that parents and children face in the name of child-centric approaches reinforces a culture of blame that targets families and restricts opportunities for exploring the impact of wider forces (e.g. inequality) on their well-being. The policy focus should be on the family as a unit at the centre of poverty and disadvantage and on the wider social and political context of inequality to tackle the challenges that parents face such as unemployment and unequal opportunities.
Finally, family policy requires a genuine feminist orientation to promote women's rights and gender equality considering that women have the greatest share in childcare despite some policy attempts to involve fathers more. As discussed previously, in most families, care work is still organised around traditional gender roles and the impact of domesticity is felt differently between men and women and among women of different social classes. Class inequalities are sharply felt by women and the burden of poverty is heavier on them in terms of implications for their physical and mental health. In the absence of social networks and public services, women tend to function as a 'buffer' between poverty and their children to manage limited resources, poor housing and the social strain from living in run-down neighbourhoods (Lister, 2005 ).
Children's social mobility cannot be attained if fathers and mothers are socially immobile and lose the benefits of employment and education. Children's life chances heavily depend on whether parents are in a position to access education and employment. Capabilities in mothers may be developed through lifelong educational opportunities but, unless the gender and motherhood gaps narrow, women will not be able to retain the benefits accrued. There is little clarity on how family policy makers interpret the interplay between gender equality and difference in families. Instead of focusing on the notion that 'what parents do matters', family policy should engage with the reality of these gaps and the fact that women are 'missing' from senior positions, especially after they become mothers. It is worrying that, with the current economic downturn, the reverse is happening: increasingly, women lose their jobs and undertake a disproportionate amount of unpaid work. Capability building should be gendered and target both inequality and the motherhood gap by offering educational opportunities to women and removing structural and attitudinal barriers while accounting for the gendered responsibilities of parents. However, as countries operate under a reduced fiscal space (OECD, 2011) , bridging these gaps is a remote possibility.
A fairer resource distribution and equalisation of opportunity and outcome
Neoliberal policies have placed a disproportionate faith on the markets to achieve public good. The deregulation of the markets and a misplaced hope that the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few will, eventually, 'trickle down' to those in need have given rise to a new moral order with individuals and communities at the top of the wealth bracket feeling that they do not owe anything to society or its institutions (Hutton, 2011) . In Western economies, the action has been at the top: the richest one per cent of households earned as much each year as the bottom 60 per cent put together; they possessed as much wealth as the bottom 90 per cent; and with each passing year, a greater share of the nation's wealth was flowing through them. It was this segment of the population, almost exclusively, that held the key to future growth and future returns (Peck, 2011) . Although the rise of super-elites is not a product of educational differences, education (and levels of education in particular) has played a significant role in explaining the gap between the haves and have-nots. Other big forces have also contributed to polarisation in society, including the technological revolution which has created much bigger winners much faster than ever before (Peck, 2011) .
Many theories have been brought forward to explain unfair resource distribution patterns, ranging from a lack of regulation of the financial institutions to human greed. However, what is missing is a wider debate about the kind of society we want for ourselves and the next generations. Very few seem to question the kind of society that offers exponentially hedge fund managers as well as the continuing rise of the number of multimillionaires despite the current economic downturn. And even attempts have been made to impose a human face on global capitalism to make it palatable: consumption, as Slavol Zizek (2011) argues, has been given a 'redemption spin' and an ethical orientation through some forms of charitable work operating within market structures. We still attribute poverty to individual fault and cultural practices (such as some people are reckless or lazy; certain cultures place a great emphasis on material possessions) but the hubris that inequality has brought about has remained largely unexamined. The message that individuated explanations of poverty sends out is that we need to manage our lives in ways that do not cause trouble or waste public resources or obstruct the flow of capital; in other words, we are asked not to change the circumstances but to adjust within them and be content with them.
The growing polarisation in society has created a social apartheid justified by a dangerous doctrine that those who possess wealth deserve to do so, regardless of proportionality, and that those who are poor have chosen to be so. Wealth has become the signifier of personal worth and poverty is seen as an individual mishap, or worse, an individual choice. The societal values, set by wealth and consumption, work against a civic renewal because what means to be a citizen is understood in monetary terms. Because of uncontrolled capitalism, we have lost the solidity of civic institutions and public services and the relationships that embody reciprocity and empathy (Hutton, 2011) . Markets' dominance is incompatible with building social relationships because a mere 'trickle effect' from the wealth accumulated at the top one per cent cannot reverse inequality and social immobility. Social class divides persist and families' socio-economic background matters more than ever before. Thirty-nine per cent of children born to parents in the top fifth of earners stayed in that same bracket as adults. Likewise, 42 per cent of those whose parents were in the bottom fifth remained there themselves. Only 6 per cent reached the top fifth: 'rags-to-riches' stories have become extremely rare and if things carry on like this, the class divide will be difficult to bridge (Peck, 2011) .
Tax policy reforms are a direct and powerful instrument for increasing redistributive effects to ensure that 'low-income households do not experience further loss in income distribution ' (OECD, 2011, p. 40) . However, redistribution strategies based on income transfers and taxes alone are less financially sustainable, especially considering the fiscal reductions experienced by most Western countries and the shrinking of decent-wage jobs. As the OECD report argues, policies for more and better jobs are more important than ever, especially for women who are hit the hardest by the current economic downturn and especially mothers who are more likely to be in part-time jobs. Many women work in more than one dead-end job to make ends meet. The best way to escape poverty and guarantee children's social mobility is education and jobs that offer a decent wage. In so doing, as the OECD report states, policies that invest in increasing the human capital of the workforce are paramount. Higher educational attainment and lifelong learning have been important in counteracting the underlying increases in earnings inequality in the long run. Access to tertiary education improves the prospects and living standards of lower-skilled people and gives parents opportunities to acquire the skills needed in the labour market but also the skills to live a life they value. Educational or learning accounts can be used as a means to help parents to achieve this objective (OECD, 2005) .
What does this mean for family policy? For a start, a new theory of social justice and equality is needed. Also, renewed debates on social class and its impact on parenting and children's well-being and life chances should re-enter national and global conversations to move away from cultural and privatised explanations of poverty. Equality is crucial for human emancipation because a 'highly unequal society would harm itself by not making the best use of the talents and capacities of its citizens' (Giddens, 1998, p. 42 ) and by producing a widespread disaffection and conflict. At the same time we should differentiate equality in accessing resources and opportunities from equality of outcomes. Equality of access can prevent imbalances due to differences in having basic resources. But, as discussed earlier, this alone does not guarantee equal outcomes and that is not only because individuals make different uses of the opportunities afforded to them. A just allocation of material resources can support families' survival and reduce conflict but, ultimately, we live on a finite planet and the idea that economic growth can be endless is faulty. Overpopulation and consumption place great demands on natural resources and on the capacity of ecosystems to function. As such, economic growth alone cannot compensate for the resulting decline in the quality of people's habitats and ways of life. Also, monetary interventions that tackle poverty but not inequality are not very effective. As the New Labour fiscal policies of the early 2000s have shown, a market solution to 'lifting' children out of poverty via financial means alone have not delivered the desired outcomes. Lifting families out of poverty has not made much difference to their lives because inequality is being reproduced irrespective of how much parents are involved with their children's learning and whether or not they show the 'right' attitudes and aspirations.
Equality cannot be achieved by treating everyone the same, requiring a workable understanding of fairness in society along with a fairer distribution of resources and services. Most crucially, we should challenge the processes whereby 'markets mimic governance', as Sandel stated at his BBC Reith Lecture. Such processes involve the use of market principles and tools in spheres of life in which they do not belong such as parenting, social trust, education and well-being. We should also resist offering market solutions to societal problems, without accounting for the moral and social limits of policy. In unequal societies, the processes whereby markets mimic governance are particularly troubling because they reveal a lack of true democratic governance and, most importantly, a diminished sense of freedom articulated as freedom to own and freedom to micromanage citizens without seeking distributive justice. A fairer distribution model and also a capability approach to the equalisation of opportunity and outcome can support the renewal of families as a civic institution. Without a civic renewal of the society as a whole (not just communities), all we can achieve is to implement another economic model of living within which everything is understood as capital (albeit a more equally distributed capital).
Families' space for public reasoning
Families' public and political space is shrinking. Here, I refer to Conroy's definition of a political space: 'it is, or rather should be, that space which transcends the particularity of the individual or group, a place of persuasion and action: the place where words struggle into existence as a way of prefacing action' (Conroy, 2010, p. 327) . A political space is a truly public space where 'agonistic engagement' occurs to test and evaluate solutions to complex social and ethical challenges. Furthermore, a political is a critical space where citizens come for public reasoning and democratic deliberation. Public reasoning is about making sense of the world and, through deliberation in public spaces, setting the norms to articulate problems and solutions. The public and social spaces where we are to 'determine how we should live collectively no longer -if indeed they ever did -offer a genuinely agonistic space where our (sometimes modestly, sometimes substantially) differing ethical and teleological claims are held worthy of consideration ' (Zizek, 2011, p. 3) . Civic institutions, including families, have become de-politicised and thus denied their political space in which individuals act collectively.
Society needs citizens who are capable of reasoning and sound judgement and have a vision of a society for themselves and the next generation. Public reasoning and deliberation are important not only because they promote human happiness but also because they protect individual human beings against being used as a means to some end or other, however desirable that end might be (Rawls, 1999) . Parents and the public in general, through actively engaging in democratic deliberation and dialogue, can identify tensions in the relationship between the state and the individual. Public reasoning is underpinned by the assumption that parents are able, through dialogue, to evaluate the viability of options available to them and play an active role in supporting their children to develop the capacities required. Through public reasoning, children and their parents become dialectical and exercise criticality and act with intent, a strong sense of selfhood and awareness of their social relationships. A form of criticality not only as an exercise of reason but, essentially, as a critical approach to ethics, obligation and difference is crucial for parents and children to realise their rights. However, this has implications for equality in that parents are not equal in their contribution to public reasoning and in their ability to convert civic engagement into a valued life.
In market societies, the public sphere is either commodified or reduced to ensure it does not interfere with the flow of global capital. Families have a limited public space to exist and exercise deliberative democracy. Increasingly, public spaces are becoming corporate, contributing to the shrinking of the world as experienced by more and more families and young people who find it difficult to locate meaning in their communities, especially as their boundaries are shifting. In a world where public space is shrinking and, as a consequence, young people's capacity to engage critically, opportunities to have a voice that is not institutionalised are very few. Also, opportunities for parents to exercise agency and use their critical and rational competence for 'discursive democracy' are increasingly being denied and with that the 'possibility of rational consensus arrived at through free, unconstrained public deliberation between free and equal citizens ' (Dahlberg and Moss, 2005, p. 152) . Within family policy, decision making has moved from the sphere of democratic deliberation and political rights to offering managerialist solutions to social and political problems. As Alain Badiou (2003) argues, we live in a social space which is increasingly experienced as 'worldless' in that it sustains a 'worldless' ideological framework in which people are deprived of ways of locating meaning: there is no public assembly for citizens to engage in reasoning and deliberative decision making and as such the only form of protest is acts of violence. The summer 2011 riots in some English towns showed that young people who see nothing in society for them can easily engage in lawless acts. These young people are seen as being 'disposable' (Giroux, 2010) and not 'hard to reach' because limited genuine attempts have been made so far to reach them and support them to become part of networks of social relationships. The young people who engage in violence or in an apolitical mass therapy do so because they have no other ways of engaging with society. People talk about their frustration due to unequal opportunities for education and employment, future uncertainty and reduced public services, all problems that require political solutions. Some young people use demonstrations as an opportunity for mass therapy to come together and talk about their helplessness, whereas others engage in raw violence and destruction. In either case, there are no conversations about what an alternative future might look like and what counts as common good and for whom.
As with public spaces, a language that is free from censorship and moralising to allow reasoned judgements and the creation of an 'agonistic' space is increasingly under attack. Despite the enlightenment emphasis on engaging critically with the world, refraining from making judgements has come to be seen as a sign of tolerance and social inclusion. Furedi (2011) observes that tolerance has become about being inclusive, being sensitive and politically correct to the point of indifference. Understandings of tolerance have changed over time from being about critically engaging with the world to not being judgemental, not provoking debates, and this indicates a departure from the enlightenment thinking of tolerance as promoting the clashing of ideas even if this causes upset. Tolerance has come to be perceived as not saying anything that might hurt another person and is no longer about engaging with clashing ideas. Not being allowed to make value judgements, however, shuts down genuine debates and, instead, 'moral vocabularies' that frame social crises as good or evil proliferate. Further, the evidence-based rhetoric that permeates most of family policy (partly a product of the polarisation and politicisation of research in education and other disciplines) works against public reasoning because research knowledge is not liberating but regulatory (see Chapter 7 for a discussion on evidencebased policy). Public reasoning involves the capacity to engage with others critically; thus tolerance as non-judgementalism is problematic because it causes confusion and restricts debates about the big issues that influence families all over the world. Ultimately, this notion of tolerance is regressive and patronising for young people and their families in their attempts to collectively develop a vision of society.
The family in a civic society
The renewal of the family as a civic institution cannot occur in a vacuum but within a civic society. We cannot talk about models for a fairer distribution and equalisation of opportunity or the expansion of families' public space and capability building through civic education without referring to some notion of a civic society. A civic society is not a neoliberal society (where corporate organisations have become more competent, organised and powerful than nation states), nor a replacement for the state. It does not advocate less government and contests moralising in family policy. A civic society differs from a corporate society in exercising distributive justice and having a strong communitarian ethos and social trust and respect, relying on networks that bring mutual benefits and promote civic activism. It is important to stress here that a civic society is not seen as a panacea or what Edward and Hulme (1995) called 'the magic bullet' in terms of replacing the state's responsibilities towards service provision and social care. A civic society does not operate outside the state nor does it advocate a reversal of the roles of the state and the market.
A civic society is not instead of the state and not a means of removing the responsibility of the state to offer public services and act as a guarantor of social and political rights (Fineman, 2008) . This is a crucial distinction considering current policy trends to focus on the efforts of individual families and volunteering organisations (e.g. charities, selfhelp groups, community groups) to reverse inequality while the state is 'rolling back' from offering public services. As Steve Wyler, Director of Development Trusts Association puts it:
The battle of ideas is, at its heart, a debate about the capability and potential for ordinary people, especially those living in lowincome communities, to play a direct part in controlling resources and exercising power. For those who take the view that such people represent a liability . . . then Big Society becomes essentially a philanthropic and moralising effort. If so, the Big Society is unlikely to succeed.
(cited in Rowson et al., 2010, p. 10) Civic participation is different from participation in volunteering activities whose aim is to supplement finance and service insufficiencies brought about by the reduction of public services. The Big Society, as currently conceptualised, proposes a form of civic participation to cover for the reduction of public services. Such models of civic engagement are likely to confine social rights into self-help and mutual cooperation which, although at an individual level are important attributes, cannot sustain social solidarity at a macro level (Ignatieff, 2001a) . Further, a view of disadvantaged people as a liability is not helpful in encouraging them to engage with society. A four-pillar approach to family policy (i.e. civic education, feminist orientation, fairer resource distribution and families' public space) is about parents being an asset (or a potential asset) and not a liability or moral failure. Increasingly, the state functions as an enabler to empower citizens to abide by the principles of obligation, responsibility and community. Giddens' third-way politics have redefined rights and obligations along the notions of 'no rights without responsibilities . . . no authority without democracy ' (1998, pp. 64-67) . Through a civic society lens, these new relationships between the state and the individual require examination. Giddens' proclamations of 'no rights without obligations' raise important questions worth asking: what does obligation mean, to whom and within what framework? As the steady accumulation of capital at the top one per cent has shown, obligation is not about mitigating the egoistic self-serving and self-governing individuals at the top one per cent but to regulate the poor and bring them closer to the market. In this context, obligation is about maximising economic profit and not obligation to family and community life, as these are incompatible. Neither is obligation towards 'following or breaching the socially endorsed, ethical legal rules' (Bauman, 1992, p. 29) . For families, rights and obligations should be intrinsically linked with capability building through civic education, a feminist orientation of family policy, fairer redistribution models for resources and opportunities and the expansion of families' public space. Otherwise, the notion of 'no rights without obligations' is about a top-down enforced social contract that takes for granted that people are equal in accessing resources and converting them into a good life. Giddens' proclamation of 'no authority without democracy' is about the importance of locating authority within participatory democracy whereby citizens develop a consensus through democratic deliberation and where authority is not delivered 'top down' but from grass roots decision making. However, a participatory democracy relies on people who are capable of engaging in public reasoning in public spaces and, thus, it is not clear to what extent this is possible within a neoliberal context where public space is diminishing and with it, forms of democratic deliberation. A civic society is about reversing this trend.
The continuing urge in family policy to derive legal obligations for parents highlights a widespread mistrust in individuals' moral capacities and thus aims to 'legislate on moral truth claims by laying them down as legal imperatives for those who cannot function within the boundaries of proper morality' (Sevenhuijsen, 2000, p. 3). The social vocabulary of responsibility, obligation, community and partnership misses notions of equality of opportunity and outcome, social justice, access to public services and human rights, the cornerstone of a civic society. As Rose argues, in the form that social democracy is conceived within the third way: it offers very little for those who think that our present is still characterized by some rather old forces of injustice, domination, exploitation, cruelty and indifference, that its practices support and obscure some fundamental divisions of power and resources between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' and that its political language is suffused with hypocrisy and double-speak. (1999, p. 474) Capability building has the potential to bring out families' 'hidden wealth ' (Rowson et al., 2010) (Rowson et al., 2010, p. 10) . It is an interesting paradox, however, to talk about hidden wealth in families on the one hand and early intervention with parents who are considered to be deficient (on grounds of disadvantage) on the other. By building capability through civic education and a reinstatement of families' public sphere, parents and children may be in a better position to ascertain their political and social rights and promote human agency but also to fight the political hypocrisy in policy proclamations that parents matter. The question of whether or not parents matter is irrelevant, a mere moral standpoint. I have never believed that parents do not matter. The relationships between parents and children are strong, based on care, compassion and nurturing. As argued elsewhere, parenting is not a technical act of raising children as a project to morph them towards an arbitrary end no matter how seductive this end might be. Parent-child relationships are important but so are the relationships between parents and other family and community members and friends. Proclamations about how much parents matter exert emotional pressure and invoke guilt on parents to change their lives into a project of successful child rearing and take a competitive stand against other people's children. Also, there are strong moralistic undercurrents in such proclamations that divert the debates that we should be holding about the wider social and economic influences that shape families' lives and parents' capacity to parent well.
Why does family policy stress that parents matter? This is an unnecessary and void statement because parents do not need to be told that they matter to nurture and care for their children. They know that and most parents do a good job of it. The capacity for care and nurturing in humans is strong and parents nurture their children not because they think that in doing so their children will turn out to be successful, socially mobile adults but because nurturing is an integral element of our evolved humanity. It is disconcerting that intimate family life is subjected to moralistic scrutiny and parents are manipulated along the lines of the omnipotent and the all-blameable parent. What is more disconcerting, however, is that the pronouncements about how much parents matter occur in an economic climate where care and nurturing are seen as obstacles to parents moving closer to the market, and severe public cuts have targeted mothers the most while disadvantaged young people have become suspects in a polarised society. One may argue that the policy focus has been too much on the family and less on the structure and the presence (or absence) of other civic institutions to socialise young people. And this trend has to change. Family policy should challenge the fact that parents' and children's worlds are closing in on them and that the average family finds it increasingly difficult to cope.
Through capability building in disadvantaged families, engagement in the public sphere and a fairer distribution of resources, we may reclaim society as a political space bounded by human rights and social justice. This is not easy because even as capitalism currently experiences crisis, it can easily mutate into a sinister socio-political state, especially considering its capacity to align itself with different political and religious and cultural places and ideas. Current demographic trends indicate that, globally, democratic forces are in decline. More and more young people grow up in non-egalitarian societies and families where the principles of equality, human agency and the pursuit of true life are under attack. A large numbers of girls and women live in societies that discriminate against them and where they have limited rights as citizens. Even within democratic nations, families and young people in poverty have become disposable, with no discernable future.
To renew family as a civic institution, I argue for the importance of civic education with both instrumental and intrinsic goals for parents and children and for a feminist orientation to policy to ensure that the different roles and contributions of mothers and fathers in families are acknowledged. For changes at a macro level, I argue for reversing the shrinking in families' public and political spaces and for a fairer distribution model, being aware of the challenges the latter throws up with regard to the equalisation of opportunity and outcome. I have drawn upon the capability approach to discuss the principles that should underpin family policy which, although comprehensive, is not without drawbacks. But I think a capability approach to family policy should be emblematic of the types of proposals we will need to weigh when thinking about supporting families in unequal societies. Most importantly, we need to re-engage in conversations about social class and the impact of neoliberal policies on families. Such conversations may begin with a reassessment of how globalisation is affecting society, and of what it will take for the average family to thrive in a rapidly changing world. These are crucial conversations because, as Peck (2011) argues, in unequal societies built-in advantages and disadvantages are growing and with the concentration of wealth in relatively few hands there is little hope that much of the next generation's elite might achieve their status through hard or innovative work and not through inheritance.
Note * Historically, the notion of a civic society has undergone many transformations. In ancient Greece, the concept was used as a synonym for the good society, operating not separately but within the state. The formation of a civic society relied on citizens engaging with what Socrates called 'dialectic' or the capacity to debate societal issues through public argument and rational dialogue. Public argument and what Rawls (1999) later called public reasoning are the cornerstones of a civic society. Civic society entails collective action guided by shared interests to defend citizens against the state and the market forces, and by the belief that the state should be influenced by democratic forces. At the start of the 20th century, unlike Marx, Gramsci understood civil society as a domain within a political superstructure but separate from the socio-economic structures of the state (Edwards, 2004, p. 10) .
